We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. JEL Classification Numbers: C72.
Introduction
issues regarding "implementation". These papers do not really appeal to the notions of the "theory of implementation". Possibly as a result of this, two problems creep in.
First, the literature does not try to achieve full implementation. That is, it does not address the issue concerning the potential problem of multiplicity of equilibrium. It may be easily conceived that a communication scheme meant to generate one particular correlated equilibrium distribution as an equilibrium outcome may have multiple Nash equilibria leading to different outcomes. Ray (2002) hints at the general difficulty in implementing a direct correlated equilibrium by showing an example where the disobedient strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium that in fact Pareto-dominates the obedient strategy profile and considers non-canonical devices for which the disobedient strategy profile ceases to be an equilibrium.
Second, the way the recent literature claims the whole set of correlated equilibria to be implementable (for example, Corollary 1 in Gerardi (2004)) does not conform with our understanding of the notion of implementation either.
The unmediated game forms used to achieve different correlated equilibria are different. To implement the set of correlated equilibria, one should aim to construct a single game form whose set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium distributions in question. Clearly, this has not been achieved by the recent literature, although it is of course worth noting that earlier (Barany (1992) , Forges (1990) ) the research agenda in this area was indeed to search for such a universal mechanism. 2 The recent literature has deviated from this earlier direction, overlooking this important distinction. This paper appeals directly to the ingredients of the theory of implementation and takes a direct approach to check whether a specific correlated equilibrium distribution can be implemented. We formulate an implementation problem in which the social choice function associates with every payoff matrix (a normal form game) a particular desirable correlated equilibrium distribution of the game and ask whether this function is fully implementable or not. We obtain a negative result. We show that many social choice functions that choose such a correlated equilibrium distribution do not satisfy Maskin monotonicity, and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
We illustrate our approach and the result by considering a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions. Our paper provides a precise answer to the problem of full implementation of a particular correlated equilibrium in a wide class thereof -it cannot be achieved. To the extent that the usual communication mechanism used in the literature is a cheap talk stage, the problem of multiplicity of equilibrium was already noted, since one always has the babbling equilibrium. Our contribution is to point out that this multiplicity is essential, as it is always to be found, regardless of the mechanism used, in order to implement certain correlated distributions. Of course, as follows from the work of Barany (1992) and Forges (1990) , the whole set of correlated equilibrium distributions can be implemented by virtue of a universal mechanism. This is a distinction to be highlighted, since it says that while the entire set of correlated equilibrium distributions corresponds to the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a communication mechanism among the players, the same cannot be said about specific correlated equilibrium distributions because of the multiple equilibrium difficulty. For a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, no mechanism exists that fully implements them. This game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely, (A, B) and (B, A), and a mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player plays A with probability ρ =
The Correlated Equilibrium Distribution
For the above game (for fixed values of b, c and d), it will suffice for our purpose to consider the following wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, a typical element of which is as follows.
where, 0 < p i < 1, for i = 1, 2, 3, and
It is easy to check that, for the above distribution to be a correlated equilibrium, we must have bp 2 + cp 3 ≥ dp 3 and bp 1 + cp 3 ≥ dp 3 , i.e., we must have
. A correlated equilibrium as above will be denoted by p, while the set of all such correlated equilibrium distributions will be denoted by P . The (expected) payoffs for two players from any p ∈ P are given by u 1 (p) = dp 1 + bp 2 + cp 3 and u 2 (p) = bp 1 + dp 2 + cp 3 , respectively. 
2 , i.e., the utilitarian correlated equilibrium distribution of the game is
where p *
Proof. Consider the (constrained maximization) problem of maximizing the sum of the expected payoffs, (b + d)(p 1 + p 2 ) + 2cp 3 subject to the constraints,
Note that the maximand is equal to 2c
and therefore the maximization problem is equivalent to minimizing (p 1 + p 2 )(2c − (b + d)) subject to the above constraints.
It is now easy to check that the solution of the above problem is
and thus p 3 = 1−ρ 1+ρ . Hence, the utilitarian correlated equilibrium distribution is as proposed:
2 . We also observe the following.
Lemma 2 Under the assumption that b+ d < 2c, for any correlated equilibrium
Proof. Consider any correlated equilibrium distribution p ∈ P . Recall that the sum of the expected payoffs is (b +d)(
Suppose if possible, p 3 > p * 3 . Then, as b+d < 2c, the sum of the expected payoffs for p becomes higher than that for p * , which is a contradiction to Lemma 1.
Hence the proof.
The Implementation Problem
Suppose the two players are interested in playing the game according to a particular correlated equilibrium distribution, such as the utilitarian equilibrium (or any other distribution p ∈ P ). They would like to achieve it, though, as the 6 working papers series unique Nash equilibrium outcome of a mechanism that does not contemplate correlation devices. Their problem can then be formulated as an implementation problem.
For any given game of Chicken, as above, we can define an implementation problem as follows. Suppose the designer knows the structure of the Chicken game. However, he does not know the actual payoffs for the two players in the game. Alternatively, suppose the design of the mechanism is made by the two players themselves, who are interested in a mechanism that "works" in order to implement the desired distribution for any chicken game (perhaps because, while the agents know that they will be involved in a chicken game interaction, the mechanism design stage happens before they learn their true payoffs). A payoff profile (not to be used by the mechanism designer, who specifies only outcomes) < is described by three numbers,
An outcome in this implementation problem, denoted by q, is a probability distribution over the four pure outcomes of the game. We shall use the notation below. Q is the set of all such probability distributions.
For our argument to go through, one need not impose that the mechanism be the same for all possible chicken game payoff configurations. All is needed is that it is the same for two payoff profiles as those in the proof of Theorem 1.
working papers series
The players' payoffs (under a profile <) from an outcome q ∈ Q, are simply the expected payoffs with respect to the probability distribution q and are given by u < 1 (q) = dq 1 + bq 2 + cq 3 and u < 2 (q) = bq 1 + dq 2 + cq 3 , respectively. The preference over q ∈ Q for each player i (i = 1, 2) is denoted by º < i , under <, which clearly is defined as, q º < i q 0 if and only if, u
We will denote the game induced by G with preferences ((º
A social choice function (SCF) f assigns to each chicken game payoff profile < an outcome f (<) ∈ Q. An SCF f is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism G such that for every <, the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of G(<) is f (<). The problem that concerns us here is to Nash implement any fixed SCF f that, for each <, consists of a particular correlated equilibrium distribution: f (<) = p(<) = p(b, c, d) ∈ P . Recall that, when any p ∈ P is implemented the players' payoffs are, respectively, u 1 (p) = dp 1 + bp 2 + cp 3 and u 2 (p) = bp 1 + dp 2 + cp 3 . Maskin (1999) showed that the following monotonicity condition is necessary for Nash implementation of an SCF. An SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity if whenever q ¹ < i f (<) =⇒ q ¹ < 0 i f (<), for any q ∈ Q, for i = 1, 2, we have f (< 0 ) = f (<). We shall now prove that no social choice function that assigns p(<) = p(b, c, d) ∈ P satisfies the Maskin monotonicity condition. Therefore, no such SCF can be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
The Main Result

Theorem 1
No social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution p ∈ P satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Therefore, it cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. 
that the lower contour sets are nested, and however,
To do so, first fix any arbitrary profile < 1 , given by any arbitrary choice of Consider the lower contour set of f (< 0 ) under < 0 which is the set of distri-
This lower contour set is characterized by the following two inequalities:
Now take any q in the lower contour set of f (< 0 ) under < 1 , i.e., with u 1 (q) ≤
This lower contour set 9 working is characterized by the following two inequalities:
and
Clearly, any q in the lower contour set of f (< 0 ) under < 0 (satisfying the inequalities 1 and 2) is also in the lower contour set of f (< 0 ) under < 1 (satisfying the inequalities 3 and 4). Thus, the lower contour sets of f (< 0 ) for these profiles are nested.
However, for Maskin monotonicity to be satisfied, we must have
To show that this is not true, recall that by our choice of b 0 , c 1 , d 1 ) . Also, by our choices of c 0 and c 1 , d 1 ) . Finally, from Lemma 2, we have, c 1 , d 1 ) . Thus, such a social choice function does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. 
Remarks
In this short paper, we have argued that the recent literature that considers the problem of implementing a specific correlated equilibrium distribution, rather than the whole set of correlated equilibrium distributions, overlooks an important point, as the corresponding social choice function may not be fully implemented. We have illustrated our point by using a specific game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions.
Within our set-up, one may still wish to consider subgame-perfect implementation to implement a correlated equilibrium distribution as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of a suitably constructed extensive game form. Also, as is well-known, under very mild conditions, any social choice function can be virtually Nash implemented in the sense that it is possible to implement an outcome that is arbitrarily close to the desired one (Abreu and Matsushima (1992) , Abreu and Sen (1991) , Matsushima (1988) ). Virtual implementation is possible if and only if the condition 'non-empty intersection of lower contour sets' is met. In our context, it is indeed met as we have the outcome (a, a) in the Chicken game. One could thus try to construct a mechanism that will give rise to virtual implementation. These other approaches would then provide a way out to the difficulty pointed out here. 
